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Abstract. Research proposing the application of blockchain technology in
accounting assumes the utilization of decentralized consensus mechanisms
based on the exertion of scarce resources (Proof-of-Work; PoW), leading to the
validation of transactions without the need of any third party. Together with the
blockchain, a shared database, PoW is expected to lead to nearly immutable
and, therefore, fraud-resistant, real-time financial registers. This conclusion
must be reconsidered, taking into account recurrent top-management
involvement in accounting scandals, often conducted through deliberate
exposures of internal and external control systems. This paper asserts that
blockchain-based accounting using PoW-based consensus paves the way for the
suspension of controls by the management, since exerting the majority of
computer power is easier than circumventing internal and external control
systems in conventional accounting systems. Alternatives to PoW must be
considered for blockchain-based accounting that prevents the management from
conducting fraud and, thereby, qualifies the blockchain for its application in
accounting.
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The Blockchain: The New Cure All?

Today, blockchain technology in combination with decentralized consensus
mechanisms (DCMs) and its application in various business sectors is on everyone’s
lips. Blockchains are shared databases that are maintained and verified amongst actors
that participate in a network, ensuring digital transparency and confidence of records
of information without a trusted third party [26]. Whereas the financial sector was an
early adopter, the demand for the technology has increased over the past years and
comes from diverse industries, such as health care or logistics. This demand is not
surprising, given the blockchain’s ability to enable decentralized autonomous
business models, defined by self-governed programs through decentralized
governance and collective consensus [27]. In particular, this allows the execution of
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Turing-complete codes for so-called smart-contracts, leading to self-executing
programs that automatically enforce properties of digital contracts [35].
One major business sector expected to benefit from the features of the blockchain
is accounting. In particular, blockchains may facilitate the maintenance of permanent
and timely records of financial transactions [36]. Its decentralized and transparent
nature further implies potential immutability, meaning that financial records cannot be
altered ex post and, if so, the probability of detection will be very high [2]. Thus,
blockchain-based accounting could possibly rule out the conduction and concealment
of improper accounting methods, illicit structuring of transactions and financial
database manipulations [16]. The possibility of blockchain-based accounting,
therefore, has recently become an intensively discussed issue, not only in an industrial
[2, 34] but also in an academic context [8, 25, 36]. The growing interest in this topic
is also reflected by the formation of several start-ups offering blockchain-based
services for decentralized bookkeeping, such as Factom [37] or Scorechain [38].
Overall, the application of blockchain technology in the context of accounting could
be conducive to the industry, which is still mainly based on standardized technology
such as computer assisted audit techniques [2]. As the digitization of accounting is
still in its infancy, the application of blockchain technology may leads to the
technological progress needed.
However, industrial and academic advocates of blockchain-based accounting seem
to neglect the still present and well-known challenges of proper accounting that is topmanagement involvement in accounting fraud [17, 32]. The severity of this topic gets
obvious when looking, for instance, at fraud incidents in the United States, where
accounting fraud conducted by the management amounts to 89 percent of all financial
statement fraud cases of public companies [3]. The following paper investigates
whether the blockchain is qualified for an application in accounting. To this end, it is
investigated how the management is able to conduct fraud and whether the proposed
intra-corporate blockchain application is able to decrease the opportunities to commit
fraud. Accordingly, it is assumed that there exist incentives for the management to
commit fraud, however, there might be technical mechanisms for its actual
prevention. Most of all, this implies an investigation of DCMs regarding their ability
to impede the management from conducting accounting fraud.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a case study of the
Comroad accounting scandal and investigates the used manipulation and concealment
techniques. Based on this case study, a generalization of the fraud pattern and the
relationships between internal and external control systems is deducted, using
additional scientific literature to support the identified relationship in the case of
Comroad. Section 3 subsequently presents a layer model for blockchain
customization, on which basis a scenario for blockchain-based accounting systems is
developed. Using the scenario as well as the general fraud pattern and opportunities to
commit fraud, identified in section 1, various DCMs are investigated concerning their
ability to serve as technical mechanism for fraud prevention.
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2

How to Conduct Accounting Fraud: A Case Study & Analysis

Accounting fraud is the deliberatively attempt to prepare and disseminate material
that misstates a company’s financial situation [32]. Involvement of the top
management, such as Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and/or Chief Financial
Officers (CFOs), in accounting fraud (hereafter: management accounting fraud, MAF)
is frequently observed [3]. Thereby, MAF includes either direct involvement of topmanagement in conducting accounting fraud or indirect involvement by convincing or
enforcing the provision of fraud by other parties. To identify the requirements on
blockchains in respect to MAF prevention, a case study of the Comroad accounting
fraud scandal and a generalization of this case for a further analysis are provided.
2.1

The Comroad Accounting Scandal

Comroad was a German telematics service provider, who developed worldwide
applicable, server-based traffic systems. These systems were sold to trading partners,
whereas retailers offered the systems as well as complementary services to endcostumers [15]. Comroad entered the international trading floor in the beginning of
1999, whereas it sales quadrupled at the end of this year, compared to its prior year’s
level of DM4.6 million. Afterwards, the company exhibited exorbitant growth
perspectives, despite overall negative trends in the industry. In particular, Comroad
forecasted an increase of sales to DM250 million in 2002 [15].
Comroad’s success story, however, turned out to be one of the major accounting
scandals of publicly traded firms in Germany. Sales developments were the result of
numerous fictitious transactions, for which Comroad invented commercial
relationships with non-existing trading partners, amounting to €19.9 million as
declared in Comroad’s financial annual report [11]. One of those trading partners was
a company named VT Electronics, which was allegedly in charge of the production
and deliver of board computers on behalf of Comroad. However, VT Electronics was
only collecting money from likewise fictitious end-customers. For the purpose of
concealment, payment from end-customers was cleared with the production costs of
equipment of VT Electronics and by down payment for further hardware and possible
retained surpluses. The only task of Comroad was to prepare invoices and to pretend
that invoices were send to end-customers. Comroad stated additional transactions with
various other Asian trading partners following a similar fraud pattern [15].
Surprisingly, the illicit practices of Comroad were not detected over a period of three
years and despite of various controls in accordance to national and international legal
requirements (e.g. the Germany Stock Corporation Act (AktG), Euro-Bilanzgesetz
(EuroBilG)) as well as standards for accounting (e.g. IFRS). Thus, in the following
the manipulation and concealment techniques of Comroad will be discussed.
2.2

The Manipulation and Concealment Techniques of Comroad

Dorin [15] describes several incidents of MAF and also the previously presented case
study of Comroad by using the so-called swiss cheese model. The model shows, how
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systems may breakdown due to human intended or unintended as well as technical
failures [28]. Accordingly, MAF may be conducted despite the existence of several
legally required and/or voluntarily implemented firewalls, i.e. internal and external
control systems as well as technical precautions. Perpetrators of fraud are able to
circumvent those controls and security measures by using the system’s deficiencies
(loopholes) for their own benefit [15].
According to German regulations, the publicly traded company Comroad was
managed by a two-tier board structure consisting of the management, responsible for
the oversight of day-to-day business operations, and the board of directors,
responsible for oversight of the management and acting as final authority with respect
to decision making [1]. Despite this top-down approach of control, additional internal
controls are legally required, for example, according to the AktG [13], the Act for
Control and Transparency in the Corporate Sector (KonTraG) [7], as well as auditing
standards such as IDW PS 261 [18]. Internal controls are measures and methods
adapted to safeguard assets of a company as well as to check the accuracy of
bookkeeping [7]. However, there exist no specified requirements for the corporatespecific design of internal control systems in the German legislation. In general, the
board of directors is under legal obligation to monitor the implementation and
development of an adequate internal control system, which may includes internal
auditors and/or an audit committee [7].
In the case of Comroad, it seems obvious that neither the board of directors nor the
internal control system was sufficient to prevent the deduction of accounting fraud.
Particularly, the CEO of Comroad was able to bypass and to suspend the internal
control system – a practice called management override of internal controls [9] – by
staffing the board of directors with his wife, who was involved in the fraudulent
activities, thereby undermining the board’s independence. As a consequence, the
board tolerated the illicit practices [15] as well as the internal auditor, who received
monetary remuneration for the maintained silence [10]. Despite the arrangements
within the company, the establishment of a close relationship to the external auditor
KPMG, by which both parties received mutual advantages, offset external controls.
Lastly, financial statement users such as investors, the stock market as well as
supervisory authorities, were misled and deceived, as they relied to a great extend on
the audited and certified financial statements attested by KPMG [11, 15].
2.3

Generalization: Dependencies in Control Systems and Accounting Fraud

The described hierarchy of the company, the external and internal control system as
well as the associated relationships between the control systems and organs in the
context of the Comroad scandal are transferred to an arbitrarily chosen stock company
i, to which the German Stock Corporation Act applies. The identified loopholes in the
control systems of Comroad are generalized and crosschecked by the economic
literature, among others [1, 3, 6, 15] as well as [32], and combined in Figure 1. For
example, existing theoretical or empirical work about the management’s influence on
the board of director’s independence [1] and other relationships [4, 9] were reviewed,
by which the management is able to exert control over the board. Solid lines indicate
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that there is a broad consensus about the indicated relationship in the examined
literature, whereas dashed lines emphasize controversies. The influence of the
management on the board of directors is determined by a variety of factors, such as
the geographically disparity or career perspectives of board members. However, the
strong influence of the management on the board of directors in the case of Comroad
can be substantiated by a large part of the literature and is, therefore, assumed within
Figure 1. It should be noted that the emphasized relationships are not generally true,
but may be part of the problem when considering the emergence of MAF.
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Figure 1. Stylized illustration of a company's control system and dependencies

Analyzing Figure 1, the existence of circular references between the management,
the board of directors and the internal control system get apparent. In particular, if the
board of directors depends partly or completely on the management and if the internal
control system is determined by the management, than there exist no internal
mechanism that might prevent the management from conducting accounting fraud by
the exertion of effective controls. This observation is supported by the findings of
Sawyer [30] as well as Caplan [9], noticing that the management will always be able
to override internal controls, especially because they are able to choose the strength of
these systems through its influence on the board. Moreover, if management override
of controls happens, there is no obvious reason for external auditors to revise their
evaluation of management integrity [9, 22], leading to additional negative effects for
the effectiveness of controls. Despite the effects of external auditors are controversial
discussed, the observations of [9, 22] coincide with those in the case of Comroad,
where the assurance service of external auditor seems to have deteriorated and,
therefore, was not able to deter management fraud [15]. Moreover, these
inefficiencies are expected to exert further negative effects on the external control
system, that is, first of all, external auditors, as well as the market, which typically
trust (at least to a great extend) third-party financial audit [22].
Overall, this leads to the conclusion that the core of the management’s ability to
conduct and conceal accounting fraud is an inefficient internal control system
resulting from a dependent board of directors, which is strongly influenced by the
management. Based on this observation, a first step towards the prevention of MAF
seems to be the strengthening of the independence of both mechanisms. This can be
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done in terms of impeding the management’s influence on the internal control system
and the board of directors as well as by the avoidance of interdependencies between
those entities and control systems. Second, MAF can also be prevented by decreasing
the probability of successful concealment of fraud through the covering up of tracks,
i.e through database manipulations and the circumvention of technical precautions.
Consequently, an effective strategy for the prevention of MAF must take into account
an organizational as well as a technical perspective.
2.4

Could Blockchains Prevent Accounting Fraud?

In view of the above considerations, the suitability of the blockchain for accounting
must be discussed, as several academic and industrial research papers propose this,
e.g. [2, 8, 36]. Certainly, the blockchain in combination with decentralized consensus
induces organizational transformation through the decentralization of single business
processes and by the potential increased involvement of employees because of high
transparency. For instance, decentralized consensus could potentially raise employee
involvement in accounting issues and the validation of business transactions, leading
to more diversified controls through the transparency induced by the blockchain.
Financial transparency is a major issue in accounting and for the internal control
system, which is concerned about the openness and availability of information [20]
that could potentially be moderated by the blockchain. Moreover, facilitating the
involvement of employees could solve a frequently mentioned problem in internal
control systems, which are claimed to be design, using an excessive agency view that
promotes a strong adversarial relationship between the management and shareholders,
but leaves out the relationship of the management and employees [32]. Summarized,
given the potential organizational changes induced be the blockchain, it can be
concluded that it is worthwhile to have a closer look on the technology and the impact
of organizational restructuring. From a technical view, the blockchain is expected to
introduce immutability of data stored on the blockchain, a feature that is frequently
mentioned not only in the context of its possible application in accounting, e.g. [2, 8,
25]. This argument is based on the assumption to apply a proof-of-work (PoW) based
DCM, which is a cryptographic puzzle, consisting of solving a mathematical problem
by the exertion of computer power. In particular, PoW is a mechanism to ration
resource access in client-server relationships and consist in finding a byte string
combined with a block header, which results in a cryptographic hash that can only be
done by the exertion of computer power [12]. Given this assumption, the suitability of
an application of the blockchain for accounting will be analyzed not only with respect
to the organizational transformations but also concerning the applied DCM.

3

Blockchain Customization and Organizational Restructuring

In this section, the structure and possible customization of the blockchain will be
discussed in the context of a business environment. Based on the blockchain design
decisions, a scenario for blockchain-based accounting will be presented.
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3.1

The Blockchain in a Business Environment: Structure and Customization

Using a very basic definition, a blockchain is a synchronized global log of events
between nodes in a peer-to-peer network. Particularly, a blockchain is replicated at
every node and assists nodes in reaching consensus on the state of all accounts [26].
Blockchains can be customized for special use cases and adjusted to business
environments, which is illustrated by a layer model presented in Figure 3. It is
assumed that the layers overlap and are partially interconnected. The layer model
provides an overview on how blockchains may fit in and support a company by
providing deployment choices and by enabling flexibility.
At the lowest layer the blockchain provides a digital infrastructure, called
distributed ledger. This basic infrastructure consists of three elements: The peer-topeer network consists of homogenous nodes and is characterized by the ability to exist
without a central node, responsible for network control. In the context of the
blockchain, each node keeps a complete replica of all data needed to independently
verify the validity of any data that should be incorporated into the distributed ledger.
Before data are incorporated they must be broadcasted through the network. After
broadcasting, a common order over data has to be agreed among the nodes, which is a
non-trivial problem in a distributed network, known as the Byzantines generals
problem [21]. This problem is solved by a cryptographically puzzle and the exertion
of computer power by which a particular target value must be found (PoW; note that
this mechanism will be explained in greater detail later). After reaching consensus,
data are logged and permanently stored in the distributed ledger. At this level the
customization of the blockchain for a business environment and/or application may
happens by the choice of general rules according to which consensus is found.
The second layer is characterized by the choice of different deployment modes
that depend on the desired openness of the peer-to-peer network and the type of data
validation. Blockchains can either feature permission-less access or permissioned
access. In the former case, everyone is able to participate as node and no prior
authorization is needed [25]. Contrarily, blockchains that are characterized by
permissioned access pre-select their participating nodes, e.g. through white- or
blacklisting and some type of gatekeeping mechanism [31]. Irrespective of the access
type, the validation of the blockchain can be either performed in a decentralized way
or by one particular or several nodes, i.e. centralized validation. Despite this sounds
counterintuitive using a DCMs, centralization may stems from the fact that the
validation is transmitted to a set of changing nodes (e.g. delegated proof-of-work) that
are responsible for the validation, for instance, to avoid too much overhead and to
allow for low latency. Contrarily, decentralized validation is characterized by the fact
that all nodes in the network are able to validate data that should be incorporated into
the blockchain. Typically, permission-less decentralized ledgers are featured by
decentralized validation (e.g. Bitcoin) whereas permissioned ledgers use centralized
validation. However, every other combination or hybrid form are conceivable [31].
This definition excludes unintended centralization, for instance, through the undesired
accumulation of the majority of computer power in the case of PoW.
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On the third level, the blockchain is shaped by system design decisions in regard
to the foundation and integration of the envisaged application. This includes that
rules within the application must be designed in accordance to the particular business
process or compliance requirements. In contrast to the general rules mentioned in the
first layer that, these specific rules state additional, technical feasible requirements.
For example, these rules may obey requirements referring to a specific section of the
AktG. Moreover, a service-oriented architecture (SOA) might be taken into
accounting, if a blockchain application must be integrated within an existing
enterprise systems [33]. However, most likely not only the interaction of the
blockchain and decentralized consensus with other information systems must be
considered, but also user interaction. Nevertheless these system design decisions are
only exemplary and customization may include numerous other aspects.
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Figure 2. Blockchain layer model and customization in a business environment

Lastly, on the top layer particular applications are built on the basis of the
preceding layer decisions. For example, smart contracts can be implemented for
insurance services or digital rights management. However, as depicted in Figure 3,
applications of the blockchain can relate to various business sectors, whereas this list
is not exhaustive. Lastly, apart from the fact that the blockchain itself offers particular
security features through cryptography, additional security mechanisms might be
implemented on the upper layer. Depending on the concrete application, these
mechanisms may range from additional data securing mechanism and fraud detection
to audit, whereas, again, this list is not exhaustive.
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3.2

Scenario: Blockchain-Based Accounting and Organizational Changes

Proposed applications of the blockchain for accounting vary significantly from joint
registers [2] to intra-firm blockchain-based record keeping [8, 34, 36]. However,
industrial and academic literature lack a description on the concrete implementation
of the blockchain as well as application scenarios, on which basis the blockchain and
the proposed DCM can be evaluated. Contrarily, this paper develops a scenario for a
blockchain-based accounting system using the layer model for customization.
As depicted in Figure 3, the basic infrastructure of the proposed accounting system
is the distributed ledger, where business transactions are referenced on as monetary
value and not as tokens. The deployment model of the blockchain is a private
blockchain maintained by a network of individuals within the company that validate
transactions, here called intra-corporate blockchain. Particularly, intra-corporate
blockchains are chosen in this paper, since full transparency of sensitive financial data
to particular companies or - in an extreme scenario - to the general public could lead
to severe losses in competitive advantages for an individual company. For example,
lawfully discretionary accounting practices would be no longer feasible, which could
be exploited by competitors, whose financial data are not completely transparent.
Thus, the following scenario is inspired by the facts from the Comroad study and the
obligation of German stock companies for publishing annual accounts (AktG), which
not implies full and real-time transparency. A comparison of intra- and inter-corporate
ledgers is purposely excluded by referring to the associated strong focus of this study.
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Figure 3. Scenario of a blockchain-based accounting

The network is assumed to consist of employees, especially, the accounting
department, the management, and associated control entities that are the board of
directors and an optional internal auditor or an audit committee, which together build
the pool of consensus participants. Employees are likely to be enforced to participate
on the consensus, as part of their work assignment. In contrast, executives and
shareholders are assumed to act in their own interest and participate either because
they want to influence the consensus protocol in a negative way, e.g. to conduct fraud,
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or in a positive way, as shareholder are likely to be concerned about the accuracy of
the financial situation. Consensus is found in accordance to the PoW mechanism,
which is assumed as DCM in all identified papers that propose an application of
blockchain technology for accounting, e.g. [2, 8, 36]. In this system, consensus will
only be found if transactions are in accordance to the pre-specified rules. Consensus
participants will reject transactions that are not compliant. Valid transactions are
subsequently logged and serve as publicly available source of information within the
company and to particular outsiders (e.g. external auditors). Simultaneously,
consensus participants are the source of information by conducting transactions via
the accounting system and broadcasting it to the rest of the network for validation.

4

Can We Prevent Management Accounting Fraud?

In the following, PoW as well as alternative DCMs will be investigated and assessed
concerning their ability to prevent MAF. According to the previously presented
scenario the decentralized consensus cannot be separated from the peer-to-peer
network. Thus, it is acknowledged that there exist threats that result from the peer-topeer network. Related attacker scenarios are, among others, Sybil attacks, Eclipse
attacks, Byzantines Joint attacks as well as Churn attacks [14]. Secure blockchainbased accounting system must account for those attacks. However, given numerous
works dealing with the security of peer-to-peer networks, it is assumed that there exist
mechanisms to provide a considerable security level for the network. Thus, in the
following the focus lies on DCMs and their ability to prevent MAF.
4.1

Management Override of Controls and Proof-of-Work Based Consensus

PoW is a mechanism to rationing resource access in client-server relationships,
consisting of solving a mathematical puzzle, using computer power [5]. Particularly,
PoW consists in finding a byte string, called nonce that combined with the block
header, results in a cryptographic hash with a given number of leading zero bits. A
block contains all transactions, which have been committed on the previous block.
Finding a nonce, can only be done by calculating the hash of the block for all possible
nonces [12]. In addition, each block references to the preceding block, which hash has
to be known, meaning that blockchains represent consensus over the history of data
stored on the blockchain. The history is considered as true, when it deploys the
longest chains, conforming to the exertion of the most power exertion. Thus, if
someone wants to revert the history, an alternative reality must be created (blockchain
fork), which occurs if not all nodes agree on the same blockchain header [12]. The
blockchain fork will only be accepted if it becomes longer than the already existing
blockchain, which implies the exertion of a huge amount of computer power, starting
from the point that should to be altered (51% attack). This requires not only
computational power but also faster data processing than the rest of the network [26].
While PoW seems to provide a reasonable level of security in large networks,
small-scale networks have been proofed to remain vulnerable of 51% attacks [5]. In
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particular, this holds for intra-corporate blockchain-based accounting systems, where
the management is potentially able to deliberately reach the majority of computer
power. Without convincing, enforcing or circumventing exiting internal and external
control systems as well as technical barriers, the management could simply use
computers or a single server, which have more computing power than the remaining
participants of the network for the effortless override of internal controls. Moreover,
if logged transaction can be altered or possible deleted ex post, transparency of
financial information is useless. This leads to the aforementioned negative effects on
the external control system, as retrospective fraud detection mechanisms that may be
conducted through external auditors are getting ineffective and subsequently also
large parts of investors or exchange market participants, which rely on disclosed and
allegedly external audited financial information. Consequently, using PoW as DCM
for blockchain-based accounting, MAF will not be impeded, neither from an
organizational perspective by decentralization nor through immutability of data, i.e.
the technical perspective. Notably, PoW would even ease the override of controls, as
the management does not need to convince others to support and conceal the fraud
such as in the case of Comroad. This especially holds in the absence of direct
monetary incentives that encourage honest behavior such as in the case of Bitcoin.
4.2

Alternative Decentralized Consensus Mechanisms

Table 1 provides an overview over DCMs developed after the emergence of PoW. For
the sake of completeness PoW-based consensus is also included. A differentiation of
the DCMs is conducted according to their ability to allow for permission-less or
permissioned access of nodes as well as whether the mechanisms facilitate
decentralized validation or not. This differentiation is done in accordance to the
second layer of the model presented in Figure 3.
Table 1. Overview of decentralized consensus mechanisms after the emergence of PoW

Decentralized
Validation

Centralized
Validation

Permission-less Access
• Proof-of-Work
• Proof-of-Stake
• Proof-of-Work based
derivatives
• Federated Byzantines
Agreement

• Delegated Proof-of-Stake
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Permissioned Access
• Proof-of-Work
• Proof-of-Stake
• Proof-of-Work based derivatives
• Federated Byzantines Agreement
• Redundant Byzantines Fault
Tolerance
• Ripple consensus
• Bilateral node-to-node (N2N)
• RAFT and derivatives
• Delegated Proof-of-Stake

Certain DCMs enable both, permissioned as well as permission-less access
(although they might designed to be used in a permission-less system at first).
Contrarily, it is assumed that a mechanism, by intention, will not feature decentralized
validation and centralized validation at the same time. However, it is acknowledged
that in practice decentralized validation may exhibit centrality tendencies. In the
following, DCMs will be analyzed, if they feature permissioned access as well as
decentralized validation and are, therefore, suited for an application according to the
preciously presented scenario of blockchain-based accounting.
Proof-of-Stake
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) is based on the assumption that PoW’s dependence on energy
consumption creates unnecessary cost overhead in networks. PoS is a form of proof of
ownership of the currency in the network [19]. Instead of using relative hash rates of
miners for network stability, the protocol splits blocks and the according transactions
proportionally to the current wealth of miners [26]. In a blockchain-based accounting
system stakes will most likely be stocks. As the management will probably have the
majority of stocks (this was also observed in the case of the Comroad scandal [15]),
the management would be enabled to change financial transaction registers at their
will, without having to respect any control system. Thus, despite the Proof-of-Stake is
initially designed to promote decentralized validation, in practice the validation of
transaction using this mechanism will be centralized and most likely led by the
management. Moreover the protocol exhibits other general security issued, such as
the so-called “nothing at stake” attack, where attackers can commit collateral as they
can go back and rewrite history from a point where they still had stake [19].
Proof-of-Work Based Derivatives
Proof-of-Activity (PoA) is a combination of PoW and the PoS and described as one
example of different PoW derivatives. Finding consensus by using PoA consists of
the transformation of a pseudorandom value into a satoshi, which is the smallest unit
of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. According to [6], this is done by selecting a
pseudorandom index between zero and the total number of satoshis in existence up to
the last block, inspecting the block in which this satoshi was minted and following
each transaction that subsequently transferred this satoshi to an address until reaching
the address that currently controls this satoshi. Only active stakeholders, who
maintain a node, get rewarded in exchange for the service they provide for the
network. Despite PoA induces less overhead in terms of communication, it does not
prevents “nothing-at-stake”-attacks [6] and therefore, does not guarantee for the fraud
resistance of data on the blockchain. For the sake of completeness it should be
mentioned that there exist further DCMs such as proof-of-capacity or proof-of-burn
that are based on or are related to PoW. However, they are rather used for distributed
payment systems and rarely discussed for other appliances in a scientific context.
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Federated Byzantines Agreement
Federated Byzantines Agreement (FBA) allows each node to select a set of other
trusted nodes, which induces so-called flexible trust, meaning that all users have the
freedom to trust any combination of parties. Nodes may select those participants
based on arbitrarily criteria such as repudiation. To find consensus, a node waits for
the vast majority of trusted nodes (quorum slice set) to agree on a transaction before
considering the transaction settled. In turn, those nodes do not agree to the transaction
until the participants they consider as important agree to the transaction as well, and
so on. The key distinction between the FBA and prior Byzantines Agreements is the
individual and decentralized trust decisions. If enough network nodes accept a
transaction, it becomes infeasible for an attacker to roll it back [23, 29]. Moreover,
security rest on digital signatures and hash families whose parameters can realistically
be tuned to protect against adversaries with unimaginably vase computing power [23].
Notably, the FBA is a majority voting system, related to the decisions of selected
trusted nodes. As in every voting system and, especially, if voting nodes are known to
each other in a closed system, strategic voting cannot be excluded. Thus, it may be
easy for the management to couple votes of particular nodes and their influence on
other nodes to career perspectives and/or monetary or non-monetary incentives,
leading to a strong influence of the management on the voting outcome and data that
will be incorporated on the blockchain. Moreover, the management may also be able
to influence the majority of nodes to subsequently alter data on the blockchain to
cover up traces. Consequently, FBA is not able to prevent the occurrence of MAF.

5

Conclusion and Outlook

Academic and industrial work proposing the application of blockchain technology for
accounting emphasize the immutability of financial recording based on a proof-ofwork based decentralized consensus, probably leading to fraud-resistance. After
identifying one of today’s core problems of proper accounting, i.e. MAF, and
proposing a scenario for blockchain-based accounting within a public company, this
paper asserts that PoW is not effective in terms of preventing MAF. This conclusion
is based on the assumption that there exist no incentive that prevents the management
from committing fraud in accordance to [9, 16, 32], rather it is the mechanism, here
distributed consensus that probably could prevent the commitment of MAF.
Moreover, proof-of-work is even expected to ease the conduction and concealment of
MAF, owing to the prevailing centrality tendencies within the system. Alternative
decentralized consensus protocols were examined in accordance to the presented
scenario of blockchain-based accounting. This paper concludes that currently, there
exist no DCMs that promote permissioned systems, featuring decentralized validation
and simultaneously preventing MAF. Overall, the ability of the blockchain and DCMs
in the proposed scenario might be overestimated or even overhyped, even if a certain
general potential of the technology in accounting could be attested owing to its
decentralized and transparent nature. However, proposals for concrete applications
must be strongly oriented on the de facto problems such as in the case of accounting
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and MAF. Accordingly, further research should focus on the development of
advanced consensus mechanisms that take into account the above-discussed issues,
and especially, the ability of management override of controls. Variations in the
proposed scenario are also conceivable. Overall, a special emphasis should lie on the
cost-efficiency of such systems as well as security as basic requirements. Without
these two prerequisites it is hard to imagine that any such system will be implemented
in the future. Moreover, a comparison of intra- and inter-corporate solution as well as
other possible scenarios should be pursued, in order to receive a more compressive
evaluation of the potential of blockchain-based accounting.
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